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1. Introduction
he antinomy of  teleological judgment (§§ 69-78) is one of  the most controversial
passages of  Immanuel Kant’s Critique of  the Power of  Judgment. Having developed
the idea of  a twofold explanation of  organized beings by mechanical and teleological
natural laws in §§ 61-68, Kant raises the question in §§ 69-78 of  whether higher order
mechanical and teleological natural laws, which unify the particular empirical laws of
organized beings, might pose an antinomy of  conflicting principles within the power
of  judgment. The first controversial questions is, what this conflict is about:1 is it an an-
tinomy between (1) subjective regulative maxims of  the reflecting power of   judgment,
or a conflict between (2) objective constitutive principles of  the determining power of
judgment,2 or is it an antinomy (3) between an objective constitutive principle of  the
determining power of  judgment and a subjective regulative maxim of  the reflecting
power of  judgment,3 or does the antinomy consist (4) in a confusion of  a pair of  sub-
jective regulative maxims of  the reflecting power of  judgment and a pair of  objective
constitutive principles of  the determining power of  judgment?4 In this paper, I will de-
fend the view that the antinomy consists in an apparent conflict between mechanical
and teleological natural laws as regulative maxims of  the reflecting power of  judg-
ment5 that can be discovered and resolved by means of  Kant’s critical method.
1 For detailed discussions of  versions of  the antinomy in the literature, see also M. Frank, V. Zanetti,
Dialektik der teleologischen Urteilskraft, in I. Kant, Schriften zur Ästhetik und Naturphilosophie, Frankfurt a.M.,
Suhrkamp, 2001, iii, pp. 1286-1306: 1288-1289, and M. Quarfood, The Antinomy of  Teleological Judgment, in Tran-
scendental Idealism and the Organism, Stockholm, Almquist & Wiksell, 2004, pp. 160-208: 160-166. I restrict my
own reconstruction to those four versions of  an antinomial conflict, which I consider to be the most com-
pelling ones.
2 This is the dominant interpretation among the earlier generation of  interpreters (Adickes, Stadler, Körn-
er, Ewing, Cassirer, Baumanns, Eisler, Engels, and Erdmann). For a brief  survey, see P. McLaughlin, Die
 Antinomie der Urteilskraft, Bonn, Bouvier, 1989, Engl. transl. Kant’s Critique of  Teleology in Biological Explanation.
Antinomy and Teleology, Lampeter, Edwin Mellon Press, 1990, pp. 137-145, and E. Watkins, Die Antinomie der
 teleologischen Urteilskraft und Kants Ablehnung alternativer Teleologien (§§ 69-73), in Immanuel Kant. Kritik der
 Urteilskraft, ed. by O. Höffe, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2008, pp. 241-258: 254.
3 Several commentators wonder why Kant interprets mechanical laws as regulative principles in the
 «Dialectic» of  the Critique of  the Power of  Judgment and not as constitutive principles as in the Critique of  Pure
Reason and the Metaphysical Foundations of  Natural Science.
4 This is Quarfood’s line of  thought (The Antinomy of  Teleological Judgment, pp. 160-208 and The Antinomy of
Teleological Judgment: What It Is and How It Is Solved, in Kant’s Theory of  Biology, ed. by I. Goy, E. Watkins, Berlin-
Boston, de Gruyter, 2014, pp. 167-184). He thinks that – although mechanism and teleology are regulative max-
ims – we are inclined to take them constitutively, that is, that we are inclined to ascribe ontological commit-
ments to those claims. The resolution of  the antinomy consists partly in the avoidance of  this slip into
ontological demands. For arguments against this reading, see H. E. Allison, Kant’s Antinomy of  Teleological
Judgment, in Kant’s «Critique of  the Power of  Judgment»: Critical Essays, ed. by P. Guyer, New York, Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers, 2003 (orig. 1991), pp. 219-236: 219-220.
5 I share this view with other contemporary interpreters who also tend to see the antinomy as a conflict
between subjective regulative maxims of  reflecting judgment, even though for different reasons, see H. E. Al-
lison, Kant’s Antinomy of  Teleological Judgment and H. Ginsborg, Kant’s Biological Teleology and its Philosophi-
«studi kantiani» · xxviii · 2015
T
The second controversial question concerns Kant’s resolution of  the antinomy.1
Several suggestions have been made in the literature: does it simply consist in the de-
tection of  the confusion about both kinds of  natural laws as regulative and constitu-
tive principles;2 or does it consist in a supersensible that justifies the unity and unifi-
cation of  both kinds of  natural laws – but if  so, what kind of  supersensible is it? Is it
an intuitive understanding,3 or an indeterminate supersensible ground of  nature, or
a conjunction of  both?4 Or does the resolution of  the antinomy consist in a unifying
principle for our human judgment only, for instance, in the hierarchy of  the two kinds
of  laws?5
In this paper, I will defend the view that Kant presupposes the idea of  a supersen-
sible that represents the unity of  both kinds of  natural laws and justifies the unifica-
tion of  both kinds of  natural laws in our human power of  judgment.6 As a first step,
I would like to distinguish three notions that Kant uses when he talks about the su-
persensible: (1) the subjective idea of  a divine artisan (§§ 74-75, § 85, § 91), (2) the sub-
jective idea of  an intuitive understanding (§§ 76-77), and (3) the subjective idea of  an
underdetermined, supernatural ground of  nature (§ 78). I will show how each of
these notions accounts for the unity of  both kinds of  natural laws. After this, I will
discuss possible correlations between these three notions: in my opinion, the textual
basis of  the third Critique alone does not suffice to clarify their relationship. Howev-
er, notes from Kant’s lectures on rational and natural theology from the 1780s en-
courage an inclusive reading, in which the intuitive understanding is exactly the un-
derstanding of  the divine artisan, which is effective as a supernatural ground of
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cal Significance, in The Blackwell Companion to Kant, ed. by G. Bird, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp.
455-469; E. Watkins, The Antinomy of  Teleological Judgment, «Kant Yearbook», i, 2009, pp. 197-221; A. Breiten-
bach, Die Analogie von Vernunft und Natur. Eine Umweltphilosophie nach Kant, Berlin-New York, de Gruyter, 2009,
pp. 109-131; P. McLaughlin, Mechanical Explanation in the «Critique of  the Teleological Power of  Judgment», in
 Kant’s Theory of  Biology, pp. 149-166, and even though they provide different answers to the resolution of  the
antinomy.
1 A clearly written overview and criticism of  significant recent interpretations of  the resolution of  the an-
tinomy (McLaughlin, Förster, and Ginsborg) can be found in E. Watkins, The Antinomy of  Teleological Judg-
ment. However, Watkins is hesitant to offer his own resolution of  the antinomy. His final word is a challenge
of  the best solutions available so far.
2 The detection of  the confusion of  regulative and constitutive principles is required in Quarfood’s (The An-
tinomy of  Teleological Judgment: What It Is and How It Is Solved) resolution of  the antinomy.
3 See E. Förster, Die Bedeutung von §§ 76, 77 der Kritik der Urteilskraft für die Entwicklung der nachkantischen
Philosophie, «Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung», lvi, 2, 2002, pp. 170-190, and Teil ii, lvi, 3, pp. 321-345;
Von der Eigentümlichkeit unseres Verstandes in Ansehung der Urteilskraft (§§ 74-78), in Immanuel Kant. Kritik der Ur-
teilskraft, pp. 259-274; Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie, Frankfurt a.M., Klostermann, 2011, pp. 149-160; M. Quarfood,
The Antinomy of  Teleological Judgment, pp. 177-191; The Antinomy of  Teleological Judgment: What It Is and How It Is
Solved). Frank - Zanetti (Dialektik der teleologischen Urteilskraft, pp. 1292-1304) describe the intuitive understand-
ing as the older and earlier resolution of  the antinomy in §§ 76-78 beside a younger and later resolution in §§
69-75, which they find less convincing. More recently, Ph. Huneman, Purposiveness, Necessity, and Contingency,
in Kant’s Theory of  Biology, pp. 185-202, argues that the intuitive understanding provides the resolution of  the
antinomy since it explains the necessity of  the contingent features of  the empirical laws of  nature.
4 Allison (Kant’s Antinomy of  Teleological Judgment, p. 230) claims that the unification of  teleological and me-
chanical laws is granted by an indeterminate supernatural ground that can be accessed by the intuitive under-
standing.
5 See H. Ginsborg, Kant’s Biological Teleology, pp. 461-462, and A. Breitenbach, Die Analogie von Vernunft
und Natur, pp. 124-131.
6 In the third Critique Kant gives no specific argument to explain why such a supersensible ground is nec-
essary at all. I think the ultimate reason for Kant’s assumption is his believe in a teleological unity of  all things.
nature. An inclusive reading also allows a consistent connection of  the resolution of
the antinomy in §§ 74-78 of  the «Dialectic of  the Teleological Power of  Judgment» and
the discussion of  the divine artisan as a supersensible ground of  the unity of  both
kinds of  natural laws in the «Methodology of  the Teleological Power of  Judgment»,
especially in § 85 (on physicotheology) and in the «Appendix» to § 91. The consisten-
cy between these two passages is an interpretative requirement that existing inter-
pretations of  the antinomy fail to fulfill.
Then, I will investigate the extent to which the unity of  both kinds of  natural laws
in the supersensible accounts for the unification of  both kinds of  natural laws in our
human power of  judgment.1 The fact that the natural laws are free of  contradictions
in the intuitive understanding of  a divine artisan makes clear that the antinomial con-
flict just appears in our human power of  judgment and in nature as it appears to us.
But if  the divine intuitive understanding is different from the human understanding,
which is a discursive understanding, what does it help to know that both kinds of  nat-
ural laws are free of  antinomies in the divine understanding? I will argue that, ac-
cording to Kant, the capacity of  a unification of  both kinds of  natural laws in our hu-
man power of  judgment is rooted in the unity of  both kinds of  natural laws in the
divine understanding since Kant presupposes a regulative idea of  creation. The unity
of  both kinds of  laws in a divine understanding accounts for their unification in our
human understanding and in nature as it appears to us since our human understand-
ing and nature as it appears to us are created. While the divine intuitive understand-
ing is perfect and uncreated and, thus, capable of  a representation of  the unity of  both
kinds of  natural laws, the human discursive understanding is imperfect and created;
it is capable only of  the representation of  the unification of  both kinds of  natural laws
in form of  a hierarchy of  laws. – Finally, I will point to the fact that Kant embeds the
regulative idea of  the divine artisan into a richer regulative idea of  God in §§ 86-91 that
is perfect not only with regard to its theoretical but also to its practical capacities and
that not only represents the unity of  both kinds of  natural laws but also the unity of
natural and moral laws.
2. The Antinomy of Teleological Judgment
The antinomy of  teleological judgment is supposed to arise when human beings
make judgments about organized beings and thereby subsume the manifold and dis-
similarity of  particular empirical characteristics of  natural beings under particular
empirical laws and those particular empirical laws under higher order, unifying laws
of  nature. Since it could happen that they choose two contradictory higher order nat-
ural laws – namely mechanical and teleological laws – that form an antinomy. But
why do human beings need such unifying higher order natural laws at all if  they
threaten them with antinomies and contradictions? Kant’s answer is that they allow
an investigation of  particular appearances in nature and, in addition, render possible
an interconnected experiential cognition of  organized nature as a whole (KU, AA v
183.14-185.22). I argue that on the surface Kant’s approach might be understood as sug-
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1 See M. Quarfood, The Antinomy of  Teleological Judgment, p. 191.
gesting one of  the following four readings of  a threatening conflict between the high-
er order laws of  nature:
The antinomy (1) appears between two regulative subjective maxims that the reflect-
ing power of  judgment applies as higher order laws when it tries to unify the dissim-
ilarities of  the empirical laws of  nature.
Thesisr: «All generation of  material things and their forms must be judged as possible in ac-
cordance with merely mechanical laws».
Antithesisr: «Some products of  material nature cannot be judged as possible according to
merely mechanical laws (judging them requires an entirely different law of  causality, namely
that of  final causes)».1
(KU, AA v 387.3-9, my italics)
The antinomy (2) appears between two constitutive objective principles that the de-
termining power of  judgment applies as higher order laws when it tries to unify the
dissimilarities of  the empirical laws of  nature:
Thesisc: «All generation of  material things is possible in accordance with merely mechani-
cal laws».
Antithesisc: «Some generation of  such things is not possible in accordance with merely me-
chanical laws».
(KU, AA v 387.13-16, my italics)
The antinomy (3) appears when the human power of  judgment confuses objective
constitutive principles of  the determining power of  judgment and subjective regula-
tive maxims of  the reflecting power of  judgment:
All appearance of  an antinomy between the maxims of  that kind of  explanation which is
 genuinely physical (mechanical) and that which is teleological (technical) therefore rests on
 confusing a fundamental principle of  the reflecting with that of  the determining power of  judg-
ment, and on confusing the autonomy of  the former (which is valid merely subjectively for the use
of  our reason in regard to the particular laws of  experience) with the heteronomy of  the latter,
which has to conform to the laws given by the understanding (whether general or particular).
(KU, AA v 389.20-27, first two italics are mine)
The confusion reading can take two forms. The antinomy appears (3a) between an
objective constitutive principle of  the determining power of  judgment (the applica-
tion of  higher order mechanical natural laws) and a subjective regulative maxim of
the reflecting power of  judgment (the application of  higher order teleological natu-
ral laws). Or, the antinomy (3b) appears when the power of  judgment confuses two
subjective regulative maxims of  reflecting power of  judgment with two objective con-
stitutive principles of  determining power of  judgment that human beings apply when
they try to unify the dissimilarities of  the empirical laws of  nature. Scholars tend to
read (3b) rather than (3a) into the passage at the end of  § 71.
Let us consider these four readings. (3b) It is implausible to say that the antinomy of
the human power of  judgment consists in confusing a pair of  subjective regulative
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1 Unless otherwise indicated, English quotations will be from The Cambridge Edition of  the Works of  Im-
manuel Kant, ed. by P. Guyer, A. W. Wood, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992-.
maxims of  the reflecting power of  judgment with a pair of  objective constitutive prin-
ciples of  the determining power of  judgment. The antinomy in this case would con-
sist of  the misguidance regarding the epistemic status of  the natural laws that human
beings apply when they judge organized beings: they use natural laws as constitutive
objective principles even though they can only be used as regulative subjective max-
ims. Quarfood1 proposes a version this reading when he writes that human beings
tend to slip from merely regulative, hypothetic into constitutive, ontological claims
when they judge organized beings as mechanical and purposive beings. As a conse-
quence, the boundaries between both types of  laws become blurred. According to
Quarfood, Kant is warning his readers to not confuse the epistemic status of  two reg-
ulative with two constitutive laws.
There is one general and strong objection against this reading. If  the confusion
about the epistemic status of  judgments would be the antinomy mentioned, then the
resolution of  the antinomy would consist in the detection of  the misguidance of  our
judgment regarding the epistemic status of  both kinds of  natural laws. And this
would implicitly justify one of  the readings (1) or (2) as the relevant reading, since, as
the analysis of  readings (1) and (2) of  the antinomy will make clear, there are internal
antinomies within each of  the readings (1) and (2), namely (1) a resolvable conflict
within the pair of  regulative maxims of  the reflecting power of  judgment and (2) an
irresolvable conflict within the pair of  objective principles of  the determining power
of  judgment. The detection that we should not confuse regulative subjective maxims
with constitutive objective principles is insufficient to resolve the existing conflict
 between the regulative maxims (1) or constitutive principles (2) Secondly, it would be
strange if  Kant continued to write seven further sections (§§ 72-78) although the res-
olution of  the antinomy was already clear at the end of  § 71, and that he would name
§ 71 a ‘preparation for the resolution’ of  the antinomy if  it presents not only the prepa-
ration but also the resolution of  the antinomy.
Reading (3a) is not a prominent one in the literature, even though some scholars
wonder why the Kant of  the «Dialectic» of  the Critique of  the Power of  Judgment seems
to interpret mechanical laws as subjective regulative maxims and not as objective con-
stitutive principles, as one would have expected him to do based on his account of
mechanical natural laws in the Critique of  Pure Reason and in the Metaphysical Founda-
tions of  Natural Science. But if  the conflict were that between a teleological natural law
as a subjective regulative maxim of  the reflecting and a mechanical natural law as an
objective constitutive principle of  the determining power of  judgment it would not
be clear why there is a conflict at all since both kinds of  laws would not result from
the same either regulative or constitutive use of  either the reflecting or the deter-
mining power of  judgment. This reading of  the antinomy disregards Kant’s emphat-
ic claim that the antinomy appears between to necessary maxims of  the reflecting
power of  judgment, and not between two different natural laws, one of  them gener-
ated by the reflecting, the other by the determining power of  judgment. Kant clear-
ly states that the antinomy arises when the reflecting power of  judgment chooses dif-
ferent maxims, one of  them offered by the faculty of  understanding, the other offered
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1 The Antinomy of  Teleological Judgment, pp. 160-208 and The Antinomy of  Teleological Judgment: What It Is and
How It Is Solved.
by the faculty of  reason. Thereby the reflecting power of  judgment sets its own stan-
dards of  reflection and is threatened by a conflict between those standards:
But as far as the particular laws that can only be made known to us by experience are con-
cerned, there can be such great diversity and dissimilarity among them that the power of  judg-
ment itself  must serve as a principle even in order merely to investigate the appearances of
nature in accordance with a law […]. Now in th[is] case […] the power of  judgment can set
out from two maxims in its reflection, one of  which is provided to it by the mere under-
standing a priori, the other of  which, however, is suggested by particular experiences that
bring reason into play.
(KU, AA v 386.21-34)
Now I shall explain why it is implausible to say that Kant tries to resolve the antino-
my (2) between objective constitutive principles. In this case, the antinomy would ap-
pear as a conflict within the determining power of  judgment (and a conflict in nature
on an ontological level). The function of  the determining judgment is to think of  the
particular as contained under the universal. Once the power of  judgment accom-
plishes a determining procedure it does not search for a universal, since the universal
is already given by understanding or reason, and the faculty of  judgment searches for
relevant particulars, which can be determined by this universal. To put that differ-
ently: the faculty of  determining judgment is heteronomous, since, as Kant says at
the beginning of  § 69, it is itself  not «nomothetic»; it only subsumes the particular un-
der laws or concepts that – as objective principles – are given by understanding or rea-
son (KU, AA v 385.5-15, see KU, AA v 179.19-24). For this reason, the determining pow-
er of  judgment cannot be at odds with its own universal maxims. However, it is Kant’s
project in the critique of  the teleological power of  judgment to prevent the power of
judgment from a conflict within its own principles.
But this is not even the antinomy between objective constitutive principles of  the
determining power of  judgment as Kant presents it. For, Antithesisc only negates that
some features of  organized nature can be judged by the means of  mechanical natu-
ral laws. It does not state explicitly which laws will be applied instead when the de-
termining judgment cannot apply mechanical natural laws (e.g., it does not mention
teleological natural laws). Kant claims in Thesisc that «[a]ll generation of  material
things is possible in accordance with merely mechanical laws»; whereas in Antithesisc
he claims that «[s]ome generation of  such things is not possible in accordance with
merely mechanical laws» (KU, AA v 387.13-16). The conflict is that the same principle
of  understanding is affirmed and partly negated. The resulting constellation of  claims
entails a logical contradiction, and thus, an antinomy that cannot be resolved. One of
the claims must be false.1 This antinomy cannot be the target of  Kant’s «Dialectic».
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1 All antinomies in the first and second Critiques are apparent antinomies: either they appear between two
propositions, which both are false and invalid (see the propositions of  the first and the second antinomy in the
first Critique), or between two propositions, which both are true and valid (see the third and the fourth antin-
omy of  theoretical reason in the first Critique and the propositions of  the antinomy of  practical reason in the
second Critique). In the first case the resolution of  the apparent antinomy consists in a third proposition which
combines both true propositions. In the second case the resolution of  the apparent antinomy consists in a
proposition which claims an alternative third between both false propositions. Kant never tries to resolve an
antinomy between a false and a true proposition since this is no antinomial conflict which can be resolved: the
true proposition is true and valid. The false proposition is wrong and invalid.
Another problem is that given the fact that Thesisc states the universal validity of
mechanical laws of  understanding, and Antithesisc neglects the universal validity of
these laws of  understanding (KU, AA v 387.13-16), both as objective constitutive princi-
ples of  the determining power of  judgment, one might wonder why Kant says about
this antinomy that it is a conflict «not of  the power of  judgment, but rather a conflict
in the legislation of  reason» (KU, AA v 387.20-21). Why is this antinomy «a conflict in
the legislation of  reason» (my italics) and not in the legislation of  understanding em-
ployed by the determining power of  judgment? One way to justify this is to say that
a positive consequence of  the Antithesisc is that human beings would either apply an-
other concept of  understanding or a concept of  reason when mechanical laws do not
suffice to explain organized beings according to mechanical natural laws. The term
‘reason’ would then designate reason in a wider sense, i.e., the totality of  the faculties
of  our mind including understanding and reason in a narrow sense (the faculty of
ideas).
However we reconstruct the conflict (2), it is such that it cannot be resolved. The
determining power of  judgment can follow either one or the other principle. Thus
the resolution of  the antinomy would be either that there is no antinomy at all (for
we can follow only one of  both principles), or that the antinomy is not resolvable in
the sense that both principles are justified and that we have to find a way to combine
and use them together, or that both principles are not justified and we have to find an
alternative third. For this reason, the whole project of  the «Dialectic», namely to de-
tect threatening antinomies and to resolve them, would make no sense.
The most plausible among the four readings is (1) Kant tries to resolve an apparent
antinomy between subjective regulative maxims of  the reflecting power of  judgment.
This version of  the antinomy suggests that there could arise an antinomy when our
capacity of  reflecting judgment searches for universal concepts under which it can
subsume the manifold of  particular empirical laws (or empirical characteristics of  or-
ganized nature given in experience). In this situation, the reflecting power of  judg-
ment could either bring into play a universal concept offered by the faculty of  un-
derstanding (a mechanical natural law, a model of  efficient causation). Or, the
reflecting power of  judgment could make use of  a universal concept offered by the
faculty of  reason (a teleological natural law, a model of  final causation). In the first
case – based on a universal concept of  understanding – the reflecting power of  judg-
ment claims in Thesisr that all generation of  material things and their forms must be
judged as possible in accordance with merely mechanical natural laws. In the second
case – based on a universal concept of  reason (the idea of  a purpose) – the reflecting
power of  judgment claims in Antithesisr that some products of  material nature can-
not be judged as possible according to merely mechanical natural laws. Judging them
requires a different law of  causality, namely that of  final causes. In each case, the re-
flecting power of  judgment uses mechanical laws (a higher order concept offered by
the faculty of  understanding) and teleological laws (a higher order concept offered by
the faculty of  reason) as subjective regulative maxims for its reflection on the mani-
fold empirical laws of  nature. For this reason, the two higher order laws that the re-
flecting power of  judgment brings into play as subjective maxims can provoke a con-
flict for the power of  judgment when it tries to give itself  a universal maxim for the
reflection. I claim that exactly this conflict (1) is the antinomy mentioned. Let me fin-
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ish this discussion with a summary of  the strongest reasons that speak in favor of
reading (1):
First, the reflecting power of  judgment is a faculty of  the human mind that search-
es the unifying universal for the (empirically) given particular (see KU, AA v 179.24-
26). It is an ‘autonomous’ (KU, AA v 389.23) capacity since it freely selects its own uni-
versals as subjective maxims which serve as a universal standard for its reflection. It is
important to note that the reflecting power of  judgment is not autonomous in the
sense that it generates its own universals. It only selects universals, which are offered by
understanding and reason (KU, AA v 386.28-34). By this selection, both universals
change their status since now they are subjectively selected universal maxims within a
reflexive process of  the power of  judgment.1 Thus, the reflecting power of  judgment
can indeed be at odds with its own choice of  maxims if  it selects two contradictory
maxims as universals.2
Second, Kant explicitly says the reflecting power of  judgment necessarily selects
maxims for its reflection, which cause an apparent «conflict, hence an antinomy» or
«natural dialectic». This conflict is an «unavoidable illusion»; however, it can be re-
solved by means of  the critical method (KU, AA v 385.27-386.10). For the reflecting
power of  judgment Kant explicitly claims both: that there is an apparent antinomy
within the power of  judgment and that there is a resolution for the antinomy, which
is made possible by the critical method.
And third, Kant states in the opening § 69 of  the «Dialectic» that the reflecting (and
only the reflecting) power of  judgment entails an apparent and a resolvable antinomy.
In the immediately following § 70 he announces the representation of  «this antino-
my» (KU, AA v 386.12, my italics) in the heading. In the heading of  § 71 he advertises
a preparation for the resolution of  the «above antinomy» (KU, AA v 388.21, my italics).
The deictic terms ‘this’ and ‘above’ indicate that the antinomy mentioned has already
been introduced. In the heading of  § 70 ‘this antinomy’ unambiguously relates back
to the antinomy between the subjective regulative maxims of  the reflecting power of
judgment mentioned in § 69, for Kant did not introduce any other antinomy up to
this point. In § 71, then, for reasons of  consistency, it is more plausible to say that the
referent of  the ‘above antinomy’ is the antinomy between the subjective regulative
maxims of  the reflecting power of  judgment (KU, AA v 387.20).
3. The Resolution of the Antinomy
I now present what I consider to be possible solutions of  the antinomy. It is Kant’s
strategy to argue for a supersensible ground of  the unity of  both kinds of  natural
laws, which justifies the unification of  both kinds of  natural laws in our human pow-
er of  judgment. Two questions require special attention: how does Kant describe the
supersensible ground that represents the unity of  both kinds of  natural laws? And to
what extent does this offer a helpful explanation for the unification of  both kinds of
natural laws in our human power of  judgment? In addition, the resolution of  the an-
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1 Here I agree with P. McLaughlin, Kant’s Critique of  Teleology in Biological Explanation, pp. 133-134.
2 This reading of  the antinomy has been suggested in Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik (Georg Friedrich Wilhelm
Hegel Werke, ed. by E. Moldenhauer, K. M. Michel, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 1969, vol. 6, pp. 442-443).
tinomy should be in harmony with the result stated above that the antinomy appears
between two subjective regulative maxims of  the reflecting power of  judgment.
3. 1. The Idea of  a Divine Artisan: «God» (§§ 74-75, § 85, and § 91)
The first notion that Kant presents as a resolution for the antinomy at the end of  § 74
and in § 75 is the subjective regulative idea of  a divine artisan, «a God» (KU, AA v 399.37-
400.6). In §§ 74-75 the resolution of  the antinomy by the idea of  a divine artisan is to
some extent hidden behind other systematic aims that Kant follows in that section.1
But at the end of  the third Critique, especially in his discussion of  the physico-theo-
logical proof  of  the existence of  God in § 85 and § 91, Kant gives more space to de-
veloping the idea of  an artisan-like God as an instance that represents the unity of  me-
chanical and teleological natural laws. There,2 Kant treats a similar notion of  the
subjective regulative idea of  a divine artisan as in § 74 and § 75, and claims that the uni-
ty of  both kinds of  natural laws can be found in this notion of  God. One of  the aims
of  this paper is to emphasize the importance of  the notion of  the divine artisan for
the resolution of  the antinomy (against an overemphasis of  the intuitive understand-
ing), since then the discussion of  the unification of  the two kinds of  laws of  nature in
the «Dialectic» has a better fit with Kant’s view of  the unity of  the critical system in
general, which he develops at the end of  the third Critique.
What kind of  regulative idea of  a divine artisan does Kant have in mind? In §§ 74-
75 he describes it in terms of  a monotheistic (and not just a deistic) idea of  a divine
being. It is a «supreme» or «highest» (KU, AA v 399.12, 16), singular «being» (KU, AA v
397.16; KU, AA v 398.2; KU, AA v 399.3, 7; KU, AA v 400.29, 35). Kant explicitly speaks
of  one ‘being’ but not of  a plurality of  divine ‘beings’. It is an extramundane «God»
(KU, AA v 399.37; KU, AA v 400.5) that «exists outside of  the world» (KU, AA v 399.2-
3).3 This divine being is endowed with two kinds of  facilities: epistemic facilities like
intelligence (KU, AA v 399.7, 13; KU, AA v 400.5), understanding (KU, AA v 399.2-3), and
intentionality (KU, AA v 398.31; KU, AA v 399.15-16, 21-22); and causal capacities like
agency, potency, and productivity (KU, AA v 398.3; KU, AA v 399.11-12; KU, AA v 400.5).
As an intentionally acting being, it is thought to be «a world-cause [Welturheber]» and
«author [Urheber]» of  the world (KU, AA v 400.30), which causes things in the world
as «products of  divine art [Producte göttlicher Kunst]» (KU, AA v 397.23).
If  we compare these statements in §§ 74-75 with Kant’s claims about the divine ar-
tisan in § 85 and the appendix to § 91, it is striking how much the physico-theological
idea of  God, which Kant discusses in the final sections of  the third Critique, corre-
sponds to the idea of  a divine artisan in §§ 74-75. In § 85 and § 91 Kant characterizes
«the highest artist [höchsten Künstler()]» (KU, AA v 438.5-6) as a «highest world-cause
[oberste Weltursache]» (KU, AA v 439.19; KU, AA v 476.24) and «world-author [Welturhe-
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1 On the surface of  §§ 74-75 Kant demonstrates that dogmatic treatments of  nature’s teleology fail. Kant
claims that teleological judgments just have a regulative and not a constitutive status.
2 Especially, I have sections KU, AA v 476.17-480.36 from the «General Remark on the Teleology», the ap-
pendix of  § 91, in mind, where Kant gives another detailed discussion of  the physico-theological argument and
its restricted function within the critical system.
3 Implicitly, Kant rules out that the unity of  both kinds of  natural laws could rely on the idea of  a world-
immanent pantheistic or Spinozistic divinity or on polytheistic divinities. The divine ens extramundanum might
also be a personal anthropomorphic God, but Kant is not explicit on that point.
ber]» (KU, AA v 438.3; KU, AA v 439.18), which functions as an «original ground of  na-
ture [Urgrund() der Natur]» (KU, AA v 476.22). As a «highest understanding [höchste(r)
Verstand()]» (KU, AA v 476.24) it is an intelligent (KU, AA v 438.6, 19; KU, AA v 440.22)
and intentional being (KU, AA v 440.32).
The physicotheological idea of  a divine artisan presupposes an analogy between
the divine and human beings: God, Kant writes, «is productive in accordance with the
analogy with the causality of  an understanding» (KU, AA v 398.2-3). Roughly, this
 analogy is that of  two craftsmen and their products: like a human watchmaker
 produces a watch, the divine master craftsman creates the world. However, Kant is
not explicit with regard to the coverage of  the analogy between human and divine
understanding and causation. With regard to the faculty of  human and divine un-
derstanding in §§ 74-75, he leaves open whether the analogy consists in the claim that
both beings have a faculty of  understanding, which is similar or in the claim that both
beings have a faculty of  understanding, which is not similar. With regard to the
 analogy between human and divine productivity, he leaves open whether the divine
artisan has a free will or emanates the world. In addition Kant does not say clearly
whether the divine artisan creates only the form of  the world, whereas matter exists
eternally, or whether he is the creator of  form and matter also. Let us consider these
characteristics of  the divine artisan in closer detail.
In view of  an account of  a divine artisan’s understanding both readings of  the
 analogy mentioned would require different foundational scenarios on a supersensi-
ble level. The first scenario would show us a divine artisan whose understanding is
similar to, if  not even partly identical with the human understanding and who endows
nature with characteristics (among others) that correspond to the mechanical and
teleological natural laws, and their order in the divine artisan’s consciousness. Con-
sequently, corresponding to the laws in the divine artisan’s understanding, nature
would entail mechanical and teleological orders and their hierarchy.
This reading offers a straightforward explanation of  the extent to which the divine
understanding on the supersensible level would be the ground for distinctions in our
understanding – since our and the divine artisan’s understanding and the resulting ex-
perience of  nature would in part entail identical orders: the divine artisan’s under-
standing would just be more complete and inclusive than our human understanding.
In this scenario the unification of  both kinds of  natural laws and the corresponding
orders of  nature would follow a pattern of  artificial production: an artist uses matter
(which can be described by mechanical natural laws) as a means to actualize his idea
of  an artificial object as an end or purpose (which can be described by teleological
natural laws). – However, a problematic feature of  this reading is that the conception
of  the divine artisan’s understanding comes too close to the conception of  the human
understanding, and for this reason, also too close to what Kant describes as the
 conceptual limitations of  the human understanding in §§ 76-77. And how can we
imagine a divine understanding, which is limited as ours? For this reason, a more re-
stricted analogy between the divine and the human understanding seems more plau-
sible – and, as I will claim in the following section (3.2), such a restricted analogy
would match an intuitive understanding.
Let us look now at the second capacity. What does Kant mean when he says that
in the idea of  a divine artisan we consider God a «world-cause» and an «author» (KU,
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AA v 400.30) of  the world? Whereas the Critique of  the Power of  Judgment provides no
real explanation of  either term, the lecture notes on rational and natural theology
from the 1780s suggest specific meanings of  these terms. In these notes Kant distin-
guishes between a world-cause (Weltursache), as part of  a deistic notion of  God; an au-
thor of  the world (Welturheber) as part of  a theistic notion of  God in natural theolo-
gy (physicotheology and cosmotheology); and a regent of  the world (Weltbeherrscher),
as part of  a theistic notion of  God in moral theology (V-Phil-Th/Pölitz, AA xxviii/2.2
1091.22-1097.18). An author of  the world is a living God whose free will, understand-
ing, and supreme intelligence are the causes of  everything in the world (V-Phil-
Th/Pölitz, AA xxviii/2 1047.24-27). An author of  the world could either be an architect
of  the form of  the things only or a creator of  «the matter of  the substances in the
world» (V-Phil-Th/Pölitz, AA xxviii/2.2 1093.17-21). Supposing that Kant did not
change his mind between the early 1780s and Critique of  the Power of  Judgment in 1790,
we can cautiously assume that the notions of  a world-cause and author of  the world
imply a divine artisan who causes the world based on his intelligence and his free will.
It cannot be clarified on the basis of  the Critique of  the Power of  Judgment and the lec-
ture notes whether this divine artisan is an architect of  the form or a creator of  form
and matter of  the world. But it should be mentioned that in his lectures Kant argues
against the view that God could be merely an architect of  the forms of  the world. He
defends the view that God is the creator of  the forms and the substances of  all mate-
rial things in the world, since only then – and this argument is also decisive for the
function of  the idea of  a divine artisan in the Critique of  the Power of  Judgment – is mat-
ter also subordinated to God’s will. Otherwise nature would become a second
 principle beside and as strong as God, following its own, independent laws (V-Phil-
Th/Pölitz, AA xxviii/2.2 1094.5-1098.25; V-Th/Volckmann, AA xviii/2.2 1196.16-
1197.20). The argument from the lectures supports a reading of  God’s causality in the
Critique of  the Power of  Judgment as a creation of  form and matter also, since only then
the subordination of  the laws of  matter under the laws of  its form could be granted
– and this thought is required for the resolution of  the antinomy.1
Against this suggestion, it could, first, be objected that Kant refers to an «architect»
in § 78 (KU, AA v 410.20), and to an «architectonic understanding» in § 71 (KU, AA v
388.35) and § 80 (KU, AA v 420.23-24, see also KU, AA v 438.3 in § 85), which could sug-
gest that he is a creator of  the form of  the world only. However, it is not entirely clear
whether these passages describe Kant’s own position. It could, secondly, be objected
that in §§ 74-75 Kant seems at first glance to emphasize the responsibility of  the idea
of  God for the purposive form of  organized beings only, which means for the finalis-
tic order in the world that lead human beings to an application of  the teleological nat-
ural laws. God’s intentional actions and intelligent productions, he claims, serve as an
explanation for the purposive, intentional characteristics of  organized nature, which
human beings judge to be teleologically organized.2 Kant does not say much about
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1 A similar view of  God as a creator of  both, the matter and the form of  the world, can be found in Kant’s
early Argument essay, even though in the Argument essay Kant still tries to prove a dogmatic concept of  a divine
creator which is no longer true in the Critique of  the Power of  Judgment (where he argues that the divine creator
of  the matter and form of  the world is a regulative idea).
2 At this point I would like to remark that Kant explicitly designates the idea of  God as an «indispensably
necessary maxim» (KU, AA v 400.7; KU, AA v 398.10-31, my italics) that reason prescribes to the reflective pow-
the idea of  a divine artisan as a thinker of  the mechanical laws and a creator of  me-
chanical properties of  nature. However, some passages suggest that the divine artisan
is the creator in a richer sense that includes the creation of  the mechanical properties
of  nature. For instance Kant claims that we «cannot conceive of  the purposiveness
[…] of  many things in nature and make it comprehensible except by representing
them and the world in general as a product of  an intelligent cause (a God)» (KU, AA v
400.1-6, my italics). In § 85 and § 91 Kant similarly insists that the divine artisan is re-
sponsible for the unity of  all theoretical laws within the realm of  nature. It is a «con-
cept of  the original being» that creates the realm of  nature according to the laws of
its intelligence and understanding, and which offers the grounding for «the whole cog-
nition of  nature» (KU, AA v 476.32-33, my italics) for human beings.1
Let us look back. So far I have argued that the first scenario, which Kant offers as a
resolution of  the antinomy describes the idea of  a divine artisan that unifies the two
kinds of  natural laws on a supersensible level. The characteristics of  this artisan are a
specific kind of  understanding and causation. Whereas it is implausible to say that the
divine artisan’s understanding is directly analogous or even partly identical with a hu-
man understanding, an alternative constitution of  God’s understanding is still out-
standing. God’s causal activity (on the basis of  his arguments in the lecture notes)
rather turns out the be a generation of  form and matter also, since only then matter
and mechanism could be subordinated to the form and teleology of  nature.2
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er of  judgment (that is he uses exactly the same vocabulary, namely ‘maxim’, which he uses in the introduc-
tion of  the antinomy of  reflecting judgment). This maxim helps us to consider nature as ordered and gener-
ated with intention (KU, AA v 398.29-31).
1 Most passages of  Kant’s account in §§ 74-75, § 85 and § 91 can be read as part of  a physico-theological no-
tion of  God, i.e., as part of  a description of  the efficiency of  a divine artisan (very explicit see: «products of  di-
vine art»: KU, AA v 397.23; «an artistic intelligence»: KU, AA v 441.3; «an intelligent world-cause (as the highest
artist)»: KU, AA v 438.6-7). However, a few passages do not fit into this picture: even though they can be inter-
preted as part of  a notion of  God which – as the physico-theological notion of  God – belong to natural theol-
ogy, they do rather resemble the cosmological and not the physico-theological argument. I have, for example,
passage KU, AA v 398.32-399.5 in mind, where Kant seems to claim that the «contingency» which we experience
when we judge single organized beings or the organized nature as a whole leads us to the presupposition of
one necessary being, namely God. The inference of  the contingency in the world («a contingentia mundi»)
from a necessary being is the basis of  the cosmological proof  of  the existence of  God (see, e.g., KrV, B 632-634;
KrV, B 643-648).
2 I would like to give an additional argument for the claim that idea of  a divine artisan is a resolution
of  the antinomy (or as I will argue more precisely in the following: is a part of  the resolution of  the antin-
omy). A whole line of  interpreters of  the antinomy – F. Delekat, Immanuel Kant, Heidelberg, Quelle &
Meyer, 1969, p. 463; R. Löw, Die Philosophie des Lebendigen, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 1980, pp. 206-208, and
in our days Frank - Zanetti (Dialektik der teleologischen Urteilskraft, pp. 1292-1294) – claim that there are two
temporal distinct levels of  text within the §§ of  the antinomy: a younger (later written) level in §§ 69-75, and
an older (earlier written) level in §§ 76-78. If  we take ‘later written’ in the sense that Kant partly revised his
earlier version and legalized a new line of  thought, then we receive much support for the claim that the no-
tion of  the divine artisan must be considered a decisive part of  the resolution of  the antinomy: since ac-
cording to this interpretation Kant’s later written version of  the antinomy begins with the presentation of
the antinomy in §§ 69-71, continues with Kant’s rejection of  dogmatic treatments of  teleological maxims in
§§ 72-73; whereby Kant claims at the end of  § 73 that although dogmatic theism has to be rejected it offers
the most compelling account among the criticized dogmatic accounts of  teleology (KU, AA v 395.3-8). In §§
74-75 Kant continues to discuss the theistic account and modifies the objective constitutive validity of  the
idea of  a divine artisan, which belongs to an account of dogmatic theism, to a subjective regulative one. Be-
side this modification he describes the subjective regulative idea of  a divine architect as a world-cause and
author of  the world in general. In these interpretations the notion of  a divine artisan would be the end of
3. 2. The Idea of  an Intuitive Understanding (§§ 76-77)
A second notion that Kant uses to present the resolution of  the antinomy is the idea
of  an intuitive understanding. Whereas in §§ 74-75, § 85 and § 91 Kant discusses the no-
tion of  a supersensible divine artisan, the notion of  an intuitive understanding that he
mentions in §§ 76-77 is a narrower account, since it covers the divine consciousness
only. Many contemporary interpreters consider the notion of  the intuitive under-
standing the resolution of  the antinomy.1 It consists, first, in the proof  that the prob-
lematic distinction between higher order mechanical and teleological natural laws,
and the corresponding characteristics of  nature exist in our discursive understanding
only and in our human experience of  nature – in nature as it appears to us, but not in
an alternative intuitive understanding, which is distinct from ours, and not in nature
as such. Second, the intuitive understanding nonetheless is the supersensible ground
for our human experience of  organized nature.
The central claim of  this account of  the resolution is that the conflict between the
two kinds of  higher order natural laws disappears from a different (divine) point of
view, which is not the human one, and by an access to nature as it is represented in
this understanding, which human beings do not have. The antinomy is caused by a
peculiarity of  our human understanding and its restricted discursive use. It arises on-
ly with regard to organized nature as it appears to us; both the intuitive understand-
ing as a supersensible ground and nature as it is experienced in this ground are free
of  the antinomial laws. For this reason, the notion of  an intuitive understanding har-
monizes with the previous result that, for Kant, the antinomy arises between subjec-
tive regulative maxims of  the reflecting power of  judgment only and not between ob-
jective constitutive principles of  the determining power of  judgment. However,
precisely because the idea of  an intuitive understanding is not analogous to our un-
derstanding, a major difficulty of  this scenario is to explain how the intuitive under-
standing and its experience of  nature is a supersensible ground for our human under-
standing, for nature as it appears to us, and for our way to resolve the antinomy which
is a problem only for the human power judgment (see 3.5).
The notion of  an intuitive understanding is extremely rare in Kant’s published writ-
ings. It appears in §§ 76 and 77 in the Critique of  the Power of  Judgment, and there is one
mentioning of  the term in the Critique of  Pure Reason, B 723-724. However, several il-
luminating passages can be found in Kant’s lectures on logic around 1771, in his lec-
tures on rational and natural theology around 1783/1784, and in his lectures on meta-
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the discussion of  the antinomy (!). Given that this is the later (and therefore more legalized) version of  the
antinomy, then the idea of  a divine artisan must be a key for the unification of  the two kinds of  laws of
 nature, since Kant poses this idea beside earlier ones (the intuitive understanding, the underdetermined su-
pernatural ground of  nature), which suggests that the divine artisan does not contradict (maybe includes)
the other two notions.
1 Most prominently Förster (Die Bedeutung von §§ 76, 77 der Kritik der Urteilskraft, Teile i-ii; Von der Eigen-
tümlichkeit unseres Verstandes; Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie, pp. 147-160, 253-276); Frank - Zanetti (Dialektik der teleo-
logischen Urteilskraft, pp. 1292-1303) and Quarfood (The Antinomy of  Teleological Judgment, pp. 160-208 and The
 Antinomy of  Teleological Judgment: What It Is and How It Is Solved). For a contrary reading of  the resolution of
the antinomy without reference to the intuitive understanding, see A. Breitenbach, Die Analogie von  Vernunft
und Natur, pp. 129-131.
physics around 1790/1791.1 In addition, two reflections (Refl 6041, AA xviii 431.16-27
and Refl 6048, AA xviii 433.15-434.3) from 1780/1789 directly address the notion of  an
intuitive understanding. I will include these passages at some points to clarify Kant’s
account of  the intuitive understanding in the Critique of  the Power of  Judgment, since
they provide a consistent view that covers a period of  more than twenty years (from
the 1770s until the beginning of  the 1790s). Most of  these notes stem from the 1780s –
the time of  the development of  Kant’s account in the Critique of  the Power of  Judgment.
In §§ 76-77 of  the Critique of  the Power of  Judgment, Kant presents the intuitive un-
derstanding as the idea of  an understanding, which is «higher» (KU, AA v 406.2) than
our understanding. McLaughlin2 pointed out that this statement in the Critique of  the
Power of  Judgment does not necessarily mean that the intuitive understanding is an in-
finite and divine one, since it could be higher than our understanding, but still finite.
Based on an immanent reading of  the Critique of  the Power of  Judgment only, this in-
terpretation is possible, since Kant nowhere in the Critique of  the Power of  Judgment ex-
plicitly characterizes the intuitive understanding as a divine and infinite understand-
ing. However, in his lectures, notes, and fragments (which are our most important
indirect source to elucidate Kant’s thoughts) Kant consistently identifies the intuitive
with a divine understanding. And it is worthy of  note that Kant ascribes this kind of
understanding even to different notions of  deistic or theistic divine entities,3 suggest-
ing that this understanding is the specific understanding of  whatever kind of  divine
entity (i.e., a physicotheological, cosmotheological, ontotheological, ethicotheologi-
cal notion of  God – which allows us to ascribe this understanding to the divine arti-
san, see 3.4). In a similar vein, Kant writes: «It is hard to see how any intuitive under-
standing besides the divine one could take place» (AA xviii 433.16-17, my transl.). I am
inclined to think that this is Kant’s view also in 1790: the intuitive understanding is part
of  the idea of  a divine (an therefore infinite and unlimited) understanding.4
The intuitive understanding, Kant claims, is «a faculty of  a complete spontaneity of
intuition» (KU, AA v 406.21-22); it is «archetypical [urbildlich]» (KU, AA v 408.19; KU, AA
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1 See, e.g., V-Phil-Th/Pölitz, AA xxviii/2.2 1051-1053; V-Phil-Th/Pölitz, AA xxviii/2.2 1114-1115; V-Th/Volck-
mann, AA xxviii/2.2 1158.20; V-Th/Volckmann, AA xxviii/2.2 1165.25; V-Th/Volckmann, xxviii/2.2 1214.33;
V-Th/Baumbach, AA xxviii/2.2:1254; V-Th/Baumbach, AA xxviii/2.2 1266-1269, and V-Met-L2/Pölitz, AA  xxviii/
2.1 606.
2 P. McLaughlin, Kant’s Critique of  Teleology in Biological Explanation, pp. 170-171; Mechanical Explanation in
the «Critique of  the Teleological Power of  Judgment».
3 See, e.g., ontotheology: V-Phil-Th/Pölitz, AA xxviii/2.2 1017; cosmotheology: V-Phil-Th/Pölitz, AA  xxviii/
2.2 1051-1053; physicotheology: V-Phil-Th/Pölitz, AA xxviii/2.2 1065; ethicotheology: V-Phil-Th/Pölitz, AA
 xxviii/2.2 1114-1115; various: V-Th/Volckmann, AA xxviii/2.2 1139, 1158, 1214; ontotheology: V-Th/Baumbach, AA
xxviii/2.2 1254; V-Th/Baumbach, AA xxviii/2.2 1266-1269.
4 McLaughlin is led to his interpretation by an immanent reading, and, from this perspective, he is right to
insist that Kant nowhere mentions the divinity of  the intuitive understanding; and an interpretation, which
reads the intuitive understanding as a finite understanding, i.e., an understanding, which is not divine, is justi-
fied. Förster (Von der Eigentümlichkeit unseres Verstandes, p. 273), in contrast, reads Kant’s notion of  an intuitive
understanding based on the lectures, notes, and fragments (which stem from the same years), where the intu-
itive understanding is overwhelmingly clear identified as a divine understanding. Although Förster is not right
to say that Kant characterizes the intuitive understanding as a divine understanding in the Critique of  the Pow-
er of  Judgment, since this claim only appears in the lectures, I agree with him systematically that this is Kant’s
position also in the Critique of  the Power of  Judgment. Förster also mentions the possibility of  a finite, intuitive
understanding, and claims that Kant was aware of  it, but presupposes the exclusion of  this reading, even
though Kant does not justify it (see KU, AA v 409.34-35).
v 407.32). In contrast, our human understanding is a faculty of  the spontaneity of  con-
cepts and principles (laws) of  understanding. It is «discursive» (KU, AA v 406.25) and
«ectypical [nachbildend]», which means «image-dependent» (KU, AA v 408.21). What
does this comparison mean? In the Critique of  Pure Reason, and from a different per-
spective in his lectures on rational and natural theology, Kant explains at several places
that our human understanding is restricted in a twofold sense. The first restriction is
caused by the faculty of  sensibility: our understanding cognizes objects only by uni-
versal features which it obtains by attention and reflection on, by comparison of  and
by abstraction from objects given in experience that affect the faculty of  sensibility
(see V-Phil-Th/Pölitz, AA xxviii/2.2 1052-1053). Our understanding is ectypical or im-
age-dependent in the sense that it gains sensible intuitions passively only by the in-
fluence of  objects of  experience on the subject. The faculty of  reason causes anoth-
er restriction. Reason avoids the maximal extension of  our understanding on
problematic concepts (ideas, originaria, Urbilder), which are unconditioned by sensi-
ble intuitions (V-Phil-Th/Pölitz, AA xxviii/2.2 1053.7-10). It avoids the invention of  new
concepts that are not abstracted by understanding from objects of  experience but in-
ferred by reason from other concepts of  understanding. Thus, reason constrains the
maximal extension of  understanding to the cognition of  objects for which the facul-
ty of  sensibility can provide the materials and represent them in our intuition (see V-
Phil-Th/Pölitz, AA xxviii/2.2 1052, and also KrV, B xix-xxxi). Our understanding,
therefore, is cut off from an immediate access to sensible intuitions provided by the
faculty of  sensibility and from an immediate access to unconditioned concepts (ideas)
withheld by the faculty of  reason.
An intuitive understanding is neither restricted by the senses nor by reason;1 it is
an unlimited understanding in its maximum extension («understanding in the most
general sense of  the term»: KU, AA v 406.23-24), since it has an immediate maximal
access to what would be intuitions for our faculty of  sensibility, concepts for our fac-
ulty of  understanding, and ideas for our faculty of  reason. It follows that for an intu-
itive understanding what would be distinct kinds of  representation (intuitions, con-
cepts, ideas) for us is intuitively given in the «complete spontaneity of  intuition» (KU, AA
v 406.21-22). The distinction between mechanical natural laws (relying on intuitions
and concepts of  understanding) and teleological natural laws (relying on intuitions,
concepts of  understanding, and ideas of  reason that cannot be given in intuition) and
their antinomy disappears, since for such an understanding the representation of  the
contents of  both laws would be given as intuitions.
Further, the intuitive understanding is characterized such that it «goes from the syn-
thetically universal (of  the intuition of  a whole as such) to the particular, i.e., from the
whole to the parts» (KU, AA v 407.21-23).2 The intuitive understanding spontaneously
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1 This point clarifies why Kant calls the intuitive understanding an ‘understanding’, and not ‘reason’, al-
though the coverage of  this understanding is equivalent to ideas. Reason, for Kant, is a limiting faculty only,
which serves to give understanding its empirically verifiable concepts and, thus, its borders.
2 A subordinate problem at this point is whether an intuitive understanding, which, as Kant claims, is «not
discursive», and is a faculty of  a «complete spontaneity of  intuition» instead, has concepts and discursive laws at
all. Does Kant’s claim mean that the intuitive understanding has no concepts of  whatever kind (and therefore
no discursive laws, but perhaps a different kind of  laws), or does it just mean that it has concepts, but they are
different from ours (and therefore does have laws, which are expressed by a different kind of  concepts, or even
generates a whole of  intuitions, which, as Kant claims, is similar to the «unity of
space» in that «in it no part can be determined except in relation to the whole (the rep-
resentation of  which is thus) the basis of  the possibility of  the parts» (KU, AA v 409.3-
8). Kant does not say much about the comparison to the unity of  space in the Critique
of  the Power of  Judgment. But if  we return to the relevant passages in the Critique of
Pure Reason, we can find the following characteristic:
Space is not a discursive […] but a pure intuition. For, first, one can only represent a single
space, and if  one speaks of  many spaces, one understands by that only parts of  one and the
same unique space. And these parts cannot as it were precede the single all-encompassing
space as its components (from which its composition would be possible), but rather are only
thought in it. It is essentially single; the manifold in it […] rests merely on limitations. […]
Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude. […] [It is one] representation that […] can
be thought as if  it contained an infinite set of  representations within itself. […] [A]ll the parts
of  space, even to infinity, are simultaneous.
(KrV, B 39-40)
The comparison to the unity of  space suggests that the intuitive understanding is an
intuited single whole, which precedes and entails intuited parts, i.e., more limited in-
tuitions. Since more limited intuitions can be spelled out only with regard to the pre-
ceding intuited whole (as a diminishment of  the whole), and the intuited whole in
turn consists in the intuited parts within the whole, it cannot be said that some parts
of  the whole are more or less necessary or contingent (which causes the antinomy for
our understanding), since of  all them constitute the whole and the relationships with-
in the whole. An intuitive understanding is a representation of  a whole in which
«there is no contingency in the combination of  the parts, in order to make possible a
determinate form of  the whole» (KU, AA v 407.23-25). Nevertheless such an under-
standing has endlessly many possibilities to represent non-discursive, law-like orders,
hierarchies, and relationships within an intuited whole; since it can represent infi-
nitely many law-like structures intuitively in the form of  part-whole-relationships.
In contrast, for our understanding «a real whole of  nature is to be regarded only as
the effect of  the concurrent moving forces of  the parts» (KU, AA v 407.28-30, my italics).
For our human understanding a whole is always the result of  the composition of
parts, it is never prior to the parts, and therefore it is not a real whole but just an ag-
gregate of  parts. What exactly does this mean? If  our understanding tries to think a
whole it «must progress from the parts, as universally conceived grounds, to the dif-
ferent possible forms, as consequences, that can be subsumed under it». For this rea-
son, our understanding entails a «contingency in the combination of  the parts, in or-
der to make possible a determinate form of  the whole» (KU, AA v 407.24-28). If  our
understanding tries to compose a whole, it must either begin with real parts, and has
to add other real parts to compose a real aggregate. Or it has to borrow the possibil-
ity of  a whole from an idea of  reason, however, then, this whole is not real, but just
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by intuitions)? Since Kant never mentions an alternative kind of  concepts, I am inclined to say that, according
to Kant, the intuitive understanding spontaneously produces intuitions only, and has no discursive concepts at
all. However, this does not rule out alternative ways to express law-like structures. This might be the reason
why Kant reformulates the problem of  the antinomy in form of  an antinomy – not between two kinds of  laws
– but two kinds of  part-whole-relationships.
the possibility of  an idea of  a whole. For this reason the only instance that can think
of  and generate a real whole is the intuitive understanding. It follows immediately
that only an intuitive understanding can cognize the reality of  an organized being
(and the reality of  a purpose or function of  the organized being), whereas organized
beings for us are not real but just possible, i.e., an idea of  a purpose or function of  an
organized being.
We could ask, further, whether the intuitive understanding is or is not causally ac-
tive, i.e., whether it is just an epistemic point of  view – a theorizing divine conscious-
ness – or a consciousness that acts upon the world.1 Kant does not say much about
this point in §§ 76-77 of  the Critique of  the Power of  Judgment. In the final sentence of  §
77, however, he claims that teleological explanations must be grounded in an «origi-
nal understanding as cause of  the world [Weltursache]» (KU, AA v 410.11, my italics),
which, of  course, is a causal notion.
3. 3. The Idea of  an Undetermined Supernatural Ground of  Nature (§ 78)
I want briefly to consider a third notion – one, which Kant uses in § 78: the idea of  a
«supersensible» (KU, AA v 412.12, 35), «supersensible ground» (KU, AA v 413.14-15) or «su-
persensible substratum of  nature» (KU, AA v 414.30). He characterizes this as an «un-
determined concept of  a ground [unbestimmten Begriff eines Grundes]» of  nature, which
we cannot determine «more precisely by any predicate» (KU, AA v 412.13-16). It is nei-
ther designated as a being like the divine artisan, nor as an understanding or con-
sciousness like the intuitive understanding, but only as (a whatever kind of ) super-
sensible ground of  nature. Kant claims that from our human «theoretical point of
view, we cannot form the least affirmative determinate concept of  this» ground (KU,
AA v 412.36-37, my italics); it can be «indicated but can never be determinately cog-
nized» (KU, AA v 412.29). The supersensible is an extramundane ground, a «single
higher principle» from which both kinds of  laws of  nature «flow» (KU, AA v 412.24-
25). Although distinct from mechanical and teleological laws, it entails the common
root of  both:
The principle which is to make possible the unifiability of  both [kinds of  laws] in the judging
of  nature in accordance with them must be placed in what lies outside of  both (hence outside
of  the possible empirical representation of  nature) but which still contains the ground of  both,
i.e., in the supersensible, and each of  these two kinds of  explanation must be related to that.
(KU, AA v 412.8-13)
In this third notion Kant describes a supersensible ground of  whatever kind, which is
distinct from both kinds of  laws, but from which both laws «flow [abfließen]» (KU, AA
v 412.25). Doubtlessly «flow» suggests a causal notion in which the supersensible func-
tions as the cause, and mechanism and teleology as the effects of  this cause. I will not
follow the term «flow» here as a trace to specify this causal notion. It could let us as-
sociate a divine instance that does not create the substances of  the world by God’s in-
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1 For a very demanding discussion of  the causality of  the intuitive understanding, which is, for systematic
reasons, partly against the text of  the Critique of  the Power of  Judgment, see E. Förster, Von der Eigentümlichkeit
unseres Verstandes and Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie.
tentional free will, so that both natural laws coexist in our consideration of  nature,
but emanates them (see for such an emanative causal notion of  the world V-Phil-
Th/Pölitz, AA xxviii/2.2 1092.9-17). But «flow» is a singular term not only in § 78, but
also in the whole third Critique and is rare in Kant’s other writings, and mostly has just
a physical meaning, connected to descriptions of  fluids and mechanical descriptions
of  their motion. Only a few passages have a theological context (e.g., NTH, AA i 334.13-
14; BDG, AA ii 118.17). I recommend taking this term as a general causal description
which Kant does not want to specify any further at this point. The predominant fea-
ture of  this notion is that it is the unifying supersensible root for our mechanical and
teleological consideration of  nature that «make[s] possible the unifiability of  both in
the judging of  nature» (KU, AA v 412.8-9). In the following passages Kant does not ex-
plain how the unification of  both laws is made possible on the basis of  this ground
but rather develops an argument, how they are unifiable for us. I will come back to
this final thought in part 3.5.
Let us summarize. So far I demonstrated that Kant argues for a supersensible
ground of  the unity of  both kinds of  antinomial laws. I distinguished three notions
that Kant seems to use when he talks about the resolution of  the antinomy on a su-
persensible level: the idea of  a divine artisan, the idea of  an intuitive understanding,
and the idea of  an undetermined supernatural ground of  nature. Two questions re-
main. The first is as to whether and if  so, how the three notions relate to each other?
The second: does Kant offer an argument to what extent the supersensible is a ground
for the unification of  both kinds of  laws in our human judgment?
3. 4. The Divine Artisan, the Intuitive Understanding,
and the Undetermined Supersensible Ground of  Nature: Reconsidered
Did Kant fail to develop a consistent idea of  the supersensible? I would now like to
 discuss an exclusive, reductive, and an inclusive reading of  the relationship of  these
three ideas. An advocate of  an exclusive reading of  these three notions could put into
question whether the notion of  the undetermined concept of  a supersensible ground
of  nature in § 78 matches both, the determinations of  a divine artisan and the determi-
nations of  an intuitive understanding. In §§ 74-75 we can find the description of  an
 artisan-like divine being whose consciousness and causal properties lead it to the
 execution of  creative actions. In §§ 76-77 – even though most of  the characteristics of
the intuitive understanding are contrastive or negative – Kant presents a divine under-
standing that is positively characterized by its mode of  intuitive part-whole-represen-
tations of  all things, the move from the synthetic universal to the part through intu-
itions, the use of  part-whole-relations as ordering structures instead of  conceptual
discursive laws, and by its causal force as the origin of  the world. How can these
 determinations concur with the characterization of  the supersensible as an undeter-
mined ground? It is also true that a KU-immanent reading of  the intuitive understand-
ing does not necessarily support an interpretation of  this understanding as a divine one
(as McLaughlin’s view demonstrated), and if  so, it could not be harmonized with the
 notion of  a divine artisan’s consciousness. Hence, the advocate of  an exclusive reading
would conclude that Kant failed to harmonize his views. But this would imply that
Kant was blind against the oddities and misconceptions of  his theory, which is unlikely.
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An alternative interpretation would be a reductive reading: there is a strong
 tendency in the literature to develop reductive interpretations of  Kant’s antinomy, for
instance Breitenbach1 does not even mention the intuitive understanding in her
 interpretation and solely focuses on the hierarchy of  laws as the resolution of  the
 antinomy for us. McLaughlin2 develops a less radical reductive interpretation, which
just diminishes the divine potential and infinite power of  the intuitive understanding,
but still considers the intuitive understanding part of  the resolution of  the antinomy.
The advocate of  a reductive reading could describe the narrative of  §§ 74-78 such that
Kant, step by step, frees the supersensible ground from properties which are irrele-
vant with regard to the notion of  the requested supersensible unity: the traditional
idea of  a divine artisan (§§ 74-75, § 85, and § 91) is a more comprehensive notion than
the idea of  an intuitive understanding (§§ 76-77), and both of  them are more deter-
mined concepts than the notion of  an idea of  an undetermined supersensible ground
of  nature (§ 78). This reading boils down to the idea of  an undetermined supersensi-
ble ground of  nature in § 78 – which turns out to be a thin notion: a supersensible
principle that we do not know and understand, a supersensible source of  whatever
kind that we only presuppose as a regulative principle to guarantee the divine unity
and the unification of  both kinds of  laws of  nature for us. – A major objection against
this reading is that it cannot offer a plausible explanation as to why Kant returns to
the physicotheological notion of  God as a unifying supersensible instance of  the laws
of  nature in § 85. Why should Kant return to his richest and most inclusive notion of
a supersensible if  it were his basic interest to reduce the theological implications of
the resolution of  the anatomy as much as possible?
The proponent of  an inclusive reading, which I would like to defend, could argue
that the notions of  a divine artisan, an intuitive understanding, and an undetermined
supernatural ground of  nature are aspects of  one and the same rich idea of  a super-
sensible: the intuitive understanding is exactly the consciousness of  the divine artisan,
which is effective as a supernatural ground of  nature. This reading has strong support
from Kant’s lectures on rational theology where Kant identifies the intuitive under-
standing at many places with the consciousness of  the physicotheological divine be-
ing. It refines a more anthropomorphic version of  the traditional physicotheological
notion of  God since it does not straightforwardly claim that the limited human con-
sciousness is part of  God’s consciousness, but ascribes to it an unlimited intuitive un-
derstanding instead, which is free of  the discursive restrictions of  the human under-
standing. All three notions describe an instance outside of  the world. And all three
notions are in harmony when we read them as causal interpretations of  the super-
sensible (rather than just a theorizing epistemic point of  view that does not act upon
the world), since in all three notions causal descriptions are traceable: the divine arti-
san functions as cause and author of  the world (KU, AA v 400.30), the intuitive un-
derstanding as world cause (KU, AA v 410.11), the supersensible ground as source of
the outflow (KU, AA v 412.25) of  the world.3
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1 A. Breitenbach, Die Analogie von Vernunft und Natur.
2 P. McLaughlin, Kant’s Critique of  Teleology in Biological Explanation; Mechanical Explanation in the «Critique
of  the Teleological Power of  Judgment».
3 This reading could be threatened by the inconsistency that in § 85 Kant mentions the possibility that the
divine artistry could also mean a group of  designers. One could weaken this objection by saying that in this
The advantage of  the inclusive reading is that it allows us to connect the discussion
of  the unification of  mechanical and teleological natural laws in §§ 74-78 with Kant’s
considerations about the unity of  the laws of  nature in § 85 and § 91, in which he as-
cribes the unity of  those natural laws to a physicotheological notion of  God, i.e., the
divine artisan. I think this is an important challenge of  Förster’s (and Frank-Zanetti’s
interpretations of  §§ 76-77.1 Their readings focus solely on the intuitive understand-
ing and do not connect it to the physiotheological notion of  God, which is required
for a consistent reading of  Kant’s discussions of  the unity of  the critical system at the
end of  the third Critique.
3. 5. A Supersensible Ground for Our Experience of  Nature and the Hierarchy of  Laws
One might wonder to what extent the supersensible is a ground for our human judg-
ment. If  at all – how does the disappearance of  the antinomial conflict on a super-
sensible level help us to resolve the conflict between two kinds of  laws in our human
judgment? And how do we resolve the conflict between the two kinds of  laws?
At numerous places Kant addresses nature and the world in general explicitly as
‘creation’. To mention a selection of  these passages: in § 68 Kant speaks about the
«works of  creation» (KU, AA v 383.36); in § 80 he points to «the great creation of  or-
ganized natures» (KU, AA v 418.18-19). In § 82 Kant describes the human being as «fi-
nal end of  creation» (KU, AA v 426.16) and says that it is «the ultimate end of  the cre-
ation here on earth» (KU, AA v 426.37); in the heading of  § 84 Kant asks for «the final
end of  the existence of  a world, i.e., of  creation itself» (KU, AA v 434.5-6).2 Kant de-
fines the notion of  ‘creation’ as «the cause of  the existence of  a world or of  the things
in it (substances)» similar to what is implied in the wording «actuatio substantiae est
creatio»; and even though, he says, the presupposition of  creation – a creator, a «freely
acting and consequently intelligent cause» (KU, AA v 449.34-39) – is not already im-
plied by the word ‘creation’ since it needs additional proofs of  the existence of  God,
Kant delivers these proofs in §§ 85-91 of  the Critique of  the Power of  Judgment. I think
the best way to understand Kant’s claim that the supersensible is a ground for our hu-
man judgment and for nature as it appears to us is that Kant accepts the regulative
ideas of  creation and a creator.
Kant’s lectures on rational theology hint at slightly different type of  answer as to
what extent the supersensible is a ground for our human point of  view: Kant there de-
scribes the relationship between our human and the divine understanding such that
it is not a contingent one. God’s understanding is not entirely different from ours; it
is just not restricted and limited as ours. If  we free our understanding from its limi-
tations we can imagine the form and content of  a divine understanding, and in turn,
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passage Kant does not point to his own concept of  a divine artisan, but to traditional arguments against the
physicotheological proof  of  the existence of  God.
1 E. Förster, Die Bedeutung von §§ 76, 77 der Kritik der Urteilskraft für die Entwicklung der nachkantischen
Philosophie, Teil i-ii; Von der Eigentümlichkeit unseres Verstandes; M. Frank, V. Zanetti, Dialektik der teleologi-
schen Urteilskraft.
2 Further references to the term ‘creation’ can be found in § 85 (KU, AA v 437.19); in § 86 (KU, AA v 442.21,
31; KU, AA v 443.1, 16, 23, 34-35; KU, AA v 444.2; KU, AA v 445.8-9); in § 87 (KU, AA v 449.16, 34; KU, AA v 452.29);
in § 88 (KU, AA v 453.29, 32; KU, AA v 454.10, 13, 24; KU, AA v 455.1-2, 12, 15-16, 31-32; KU, AA v 456.15); in § 90
(KU, AA v 463.26); and in § 91 (KU, AA v 469.30).
not before we posit God as necessary maximum of  insight and reality we can think
of  a less extended, limited understanding like ours and the possibility of  things as they
appear to us (V-Th/Volckmann, AA xviii/2.2 1158.25-39). As already mentioned above,
Kant thinks that the faculties of  sensibility and reason restrict our understanding to
its empirical and discursive use. God’s purely intuitive understanding, in contrast, has
an immediate insight into originaria, original intuitions:
We must have a maximum, and we cannot otherwise reach it as by a removal of  all limita-
tions. Let us say: Our understanding cannot conceive of  things otherwise than by universal
features. This, however, is a limitation of  the human understanding, which cannot happen in
God. For this reason we imagine a maximum of  an understanding, i.e., an intuitive under-
standing.
(V-Phil-Th/Pölitz, AA xxviii/2.2 996.18-24)1
Another argument for the grounding force of  the intuitive understanding is that on-
ly the intuitive understanding can represent (and generate) an order in which the re-
al whole precedes the parts, i.e., for which ideas of  purposes are prior to the parts and
are real. Our theoretical understanding, which is committed to go from the part to
the whole, and thus, also our theoretical reason, inferring ideas (e.g., purposes) from
our concepts of  understanding, cannot represent a real purpose, since for a purpose
it would be required to go from a whole, which is prior, to the parts. Only an intuitive
understanding can generate a real purpose, and the capacity to comprehend the pos-
sibility of  purposes for us depends on the reality of  purposes in God’s understanding.
It remains to be said how our understanding unifies the two kinds of  laws of  na-
ture. Here, I agree with the analyses of  current interpreters like Ginsborg (2006),
 Breitenbach (2009), Quarfood (2014),2 and others who say that § 78 offers the most
compelling argument for the arrangement of  the two kinds of  laws in our human un-
derstanding. Kant describes this unification of  the two kinds of  theoretical laws of  na-
ture, of  mechanism and teleology as a means-end-relationship (KU, AA v 414.12-13, 27;
KU, AA v 414.37-415.1) whereby mechanical laws serve as «subordinated» (KU, AA v
414.9, 15, 27; KU, AA v 415.11, 22) means to super-ordinate teleological laws as their end:
For where ends are conceived as grounds of  the possibility of  certain things, there one must
also assume means the laws of  the operation of  which do not of  themselves need anything that
presupposes an end, which can thus be mechanical yet still be a cause subordinated to inten-
tional effects. Hence even in organic products of  nature, but even more if  […] we assume that
intentionality in the connection of  natural causes in accordance with particular laws is also
[…] the universal principle of  the reflecting power of  judgment for the whole of  nature (the
world), we can conceive a great and even universal connection of  the mechanical laws with
the teleological ones in the productions of  nature, without confusing the principles for judg-
ing it with one another and putting one in the place of  the other, because in a teleological
judging of  matter, even if  the form which it assumes is judged as possible only in accord with
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1 See «Wir müssen aber das Maximum haben, und dies erhalten wir nicht anders, als durch Auf hebung
aller Einschränkung, und sagen so: Unser Verstand kann nicht anders, als durch allgemeine Merkmale Dinge
erkennen; dies ist aber eine Einschränkung des menschlichen Verstandes, und bei Gott kann diese nicht statt
finden. Demnach denken wir uns das Maximum des Verstandes, d.i. einen anschauenden Verstand» (V-Phil-
Th/Pölitz, AA xxviii/2.2 996.18-24).
2 H. Ginsborg, Kant’s Biological Teleology; A. Breitenbach, Die Analogie von Vernunft und Natur; M. Quar-
food, The Antinomy of  Teleological Judgment: What It Is and How It Is Solved.
an intention, still its nature, in accordance with mechanical laws, can also be subordinated as
a means to that represented end.
(KU, AA v 414.12-27, italics partly added)
Kant confesses that he is not able to say how much mechanism can contribute as a
means to the final end of  nature, but that we shall try to explain nature as far as we
can by mechanical laws since the determining laws of  understanding alone allow an
insight into nature for us (KU, AA v 414.36-415.22).1
3. 6. Arrived?
Almost. In §§ 86-91 Kant describes an ethico-theological notion of  God whose capac-
ity is not only to represent the unity of  the theoretical laws of  nature, that is, the uni-
ty of  mechanical and teleological natural laws and the unity of  a nature that follows
these laws, but also the unity of  the theoretical and practical laws, that is, the unity of
the mechanical and teleological natural and the teleological moral laws, and the uni-
ty of  a world that follows these laws (KU, AA v 444.12-15; KU, AA v 456.11-22). The reg-
ulative idea of  God that we described above would already suffice to account for the
unity of  both kinds of  natural laws. However, since for Kant, this aspect of  God is on-
ly an aspect of  a richer idea of  God who represents the unity of  natural and moral
laws, it is ultimately this richest regulative idea of  a theoretical intelligent, intention-
al and practical wise God, endowed with a consciousness, in which not only the
 theoretical, but also the theoretical and practical laws are one, that forms the super-
sensible ground of  the unity of  the mechanical and teleological higher order natural
laws, and the unity of  natural and moral laws.
Abstract
The antinomy of  teleological judgment is one of  the most controversial passages of  Kant’s
Critique of  the Power of  Judgment. Having developed the idea of  an explanation of  organized
beings by mechanical and teleological natural laws in §§ 61-68, in §§ 69-78 Kant raises the ques-
tion of  whether higher order mechanical and teleological natural laws, which unify the par-
ticular empirical laws of  organized beings, might pose an antinomy of  conflicting principles
within the power of  judgment. I will argue against alternative views that this antinomy is nei-
ther a conflict between objective constitutive principles of  the determining power of  judg-
ment nor a conflict between an objective constitutive principle of  the determining power of
judgment and a subjective regulative maxim of  the reflecting power of  judgment nor does it
consist in a confusion of  a pair of  subjective regulative maxims of  the reflecting power of  judg-
ment with a pair of  objective constitutive principles of  the determining power of  judgment,
but does consist in an apparent conflict between mechanical and teleological natural laws as
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1 Regarding the subordination of  mechanism as a means under teleology as an end as a resolution of  the
antinomy for our human judgment, I agree with Quarfood (The Antinomy of  Teleological Judgment) and Förster
(Von der Eigentümlichkeit unseres Verstandes) that this thought reminds us of  the resolution of  the antinomy of
practical reason in the Critique of  Practical Reason rather than the resolution of  the third antinomy in the Cri-
tique of  Pure Reason, as McLaughlin (Kant’s Critique of  Teleology in Biological Explanation) claimed. In the resolu-
tion of  the third antinomy in the Critique of  Pure Reason Kant only argues for the possibility of  a coexistence of
the causalities of  nature and freedom. In the resolution of  the antinomy of  practical reason, however, the prin-
ciple of  happiness is subordinated to the principle of  the worthiness to be happy within the highest moral good
(KpV, AA v 119.1-24). Within this relationship, happiness is thought to contribute to the final end of  morality
which resembles a means end relationship rather than a sheer coexistence.
subjective regulative maxims of  the reflecting power of  judgment. I will further argue that
Kant’s resolution of  the antinomy consists in the regulative idea of  a supersensible that rep-
resents the unity of  both kinds of  natural laws and justifies the unification of  both kinds of
natural laws in the human power of  judgment. Kant uses three notions when he talks about
the supersensible – the regulative idea of  a divine artisan, the regulative idea of  a divine intu-
itive understanding, and the regulative idea of  an underdetermined, supernatural ground of
nature. I will show how each of  these notions accounts for the unity of  both kinds of  natural
laws and will discuss possible correlations between them. I will then explain how the unity of
both kinds of  natural laws in the regulative idea of  a supersensible accounts for the unifica-
tion of  both kinds of  natural laws in the human power of  judgment. While the divine intu-
itive understanding is perfect and uncreated and, thus, capable of  a representation of  the uni-
ty of  both kinds of  natural laws, the human discursive understanding is imperfect and created;
it is capable only of  the representation of  the unification of  both kinds of  natural laws in form
of  a hierarchy of  laws.
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